Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK
Summary of the case Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed a motion to dismiss filed by Chevy Chase Buick, which was construed as a motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court denied the motion, holding that a judgment is final for purposes of appeal even if a post-trial motion for attorney's fees is pending.
Key Issues of the case Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK
- Appellate jurisdiction
- Finality of judgment despite pending attorney's fees motion
Key Facts of the case Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK
- Chevy Chase Buick filed a motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
- A motion for attorney's fees by Hyundai Motor Finance Co. was pending in the trial court.
Decision of the case Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK
Motion to dismiss denied.
Impact of the case Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK
Clarifies that pending motions for attorney's fees do not affect the finality of a judgment for appeal purposes.
Opinions
960 A.2d 281 (2008) Colin ANDREW, Appellant, v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK and Hyundai Motor Finance Co., Appellees. No. 08-CV-1087. District of Columbia Court of Appeals. November 6, 2008.
On Appellee Chevy Chase Buick's Motion to Dismiss. David F. Grimaldi, Washington, DC, was on appellee Chevy Chase Buick's motion to dismiss. Before GLICKMAN, Associate Judge, and NEBEKER and TERRY, Senior Judges. PER CURIAM: On September 15, 2008, counsel for Chevy Chase Buick wrote a letter to the Clerk of this Court in which he noted that, while the dispositive issues below had been resolved, a motion for attorney's fees filed by Hyundai Motor Finance Co. remained pending in the trial court.
Construing the letter as a motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction, we deny it. A judgment is final for purposes of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of a post-trial motion for attorney's fees. See Pallie v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 697 A.2d 1239, 1242 n. 1 (D.C.1997); Dyer v. William S.
Bergman & Assocs., Inc., 635 A.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C. 1993) (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)); Marlyn Condo., Inc. v. McDowell, 576 A.2d 1346, 1347 n. 1 (D.C.1990); see also Valentine v. Elliott (In re Estate of Delaney), 819 A.2d 968, 1001 (D.C.2003) (“[W]hen a requested amendment raises issues that are, for all practical purposes, collateral to and separate from the decision on the merits, the order disposing of the merits remains appealable.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
So ordered.