Daniel Miguel v. Jorge J. Miguel, Etc.

      Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed March 25, 2026.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D24-2266
                    Lower Tribunal No. 24-2148-CP-02
                           ________________


                          Daniel Miguel, et al.,
                                 Appellants,

                                     vs.

                         Jorge J. Miguel, etc.,
                                  Appellee.


     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose Luis
Fernandez, Judge.

     Dieguez & Associates, PLLC, Anthony Dieguez, and Rebekah E.
Guerrero, for appellants.

     Paul M. Cowan & Associates, P.A., Paul M. Cowan, and Manuel A.
Celaya, for appellee.


Before SCALES, C.J., and EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Affirmed. See Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760

So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) (providing that the standard of review of an order

granting summary judgment is de novo); Seal Prods. v. Mansfield, 705 So.

2d 973, 975 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“[T]he hearing on the motion for summary

judgment consists of the legal argument of counsel, not the taking of

evidence. Consequently, it is not necessary to procure a transcript of the

summary judgment hearing, although it is permissible and often helpful to do

so.” (internal citations omitted)); Hardison v. Bank of New York Mellon, 399

So. 3d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“The most salient impediment to

meaningful review of the trial court’s decision is not the absence of findings,

but the absence of a transcript.” (quoting Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So. 2d 1261,

1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007))); In re Wells, 259 B.R. 776, 779 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.

2001) (“The merger doctrine is applicable where either the entire beneficial

interest passes to the trustee or where the legal title passes to a sole

beneficiary. Upon merger of the legal and equitable titles, the holder of both

interests possesses fee simple ownership of the property.” (internal citations

omitted)); J.T.A. Factors, Inc. v. Philcon Servs., Inc., 820 So. 2d 367, 370

(Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“As a general rule, it is not appropriate for a party to

raise an issue for the first time on appeal. . . . Thus, because these claimed

errors were not preserved before the trial court, they are deemed waived.”).



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