United States v. Trinidad Balderas-Sanchez

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4475

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TRINIDAD BALDERAS-SANCHEZ, a/k/a Leonet Arias, a/k/a Leonetta Arias, a/k/a Leonetta Artias, a/k/a Manuel Bandero, a/k/a Manuel I Bandero, a/k/a Daniuel Guzman, a/k/a Bladimirs Ramines, a/k/a Manases Torres,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paul W. Grimm, District Judge. (8:15cr-00004-PWG-1)

Submitted: January 29, 2016 Decided: February 12, 2016

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan S. Skelton, Appellate Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Conor Mulroe, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

The district court sentenced Trinidad Balderas-Sanchez to

48 months’ imprisonment after he pled guilty to illegal reentry

of a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2)

(2012). Balderas-Sanchez argues on appeal that his sentence is

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Finding no error,

we affirm.

We review a defendant’s sentence for reasonableness using

an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Under this standard, a sentence is

reviewed for both procedural and substantive reasonableness.

Id. at 51. A district court’s failure to adequately explain its

sentence is a “significant procedural error.” Id.

Balderas-Sanchez argues that his sentence is procedurally

unreasonable because the district court failed to address his

arguments in mitigation and, thus, failed to adequately explain

his sentence. In evaluating a sentencing court’s explanation of

a selected sentence, we have consistently held that, while the

district court must consider the statutory factors and explain

the sentence, “it need not robotically tick through the

[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.” United States v.

Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted). At the same time, the district court “must make

an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”

2 Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. While the “individualized assessment need

not be elaborate or lengthy, . . . it must provide a rationale

tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate to permit

meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d

325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court agreed with Balderas-Sanchez’s

argument that a sentence within the Guidelines range was not

warranted. However, the district court did not agree with the

extent of Balderas-Sanchez’s proposed variance, noting that a

sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment was needed to deter

Balderas-Sanchez and others from returning to the United States

illegally. Moreover, the district court considered Balderas-

Sanchez’s argument about the national average sentence for an

illegal-reentry case, finding it “informative . . . but not

dispositive.” (J.A. 127). * Thus, we conclude that the district

court adequately explained its chosen sentence.

Because the sentence is free of “significant procedural

error,” we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]

into account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S.

at 51. “Any sentence that is within or below a properly

calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.”

United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert.

* “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties.

3 denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). “Such a presumption can only be

rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when

measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” Id. While

Balderas-Sanchez argues that his sentence is substantively

unreasonable because it creates unwarranted sentencing

disparities, we conclude that he has failed to overcome the

presumption of reasonableness afforded his below-Guidelines

sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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