Yznn Yrastorza v. Loretta E. Lynch

13-71033·Judge: Kleinfeld, Mekeown, Ikuta·Attorney: Don P. Chairez, Law Office of Don Chai-rez, Anaheim, CA, for Petitioner., Matthew Albert Connelly, Trial, OIL, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.0 citations

Opinions

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 12 2016 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YZNN LOUIS YRASTORZA, No. 13-71033

Petitioner, Agency No. A074-545-505

v. MEMORANDUM* LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 10, 2016** Pasadena, California

Before: KLEINFELD, McKEOWN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

Yznn Yrastorza petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(BIA) decision that he is removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony

theft offense. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). jurisdiction to review Yrastorza’s legal and constitutional claims under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D).

The BIA did not err in holding that Yrastorza’s Nevada conviction for

larceny from the person, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.270, qualified as an aggravated

felony theft offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). The BIA correctly

determined that the elements of section 205.270 of the Nevada Revised Statutes

criminalize the same or lesser conduct as the federal generic theft offense, see

United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc),

because in Nevada the “intent to steal” means “the specific intent to permanently

deprive the owner of his property,” Harvey v. State, 375 P.2d 225, 226 (Nev.

1962); see also Grant v. State, 24 P.3d 761, 766 (Nev. 2001).

We have defined “theft offense” for purposes of § 1101(a)(43)(G), see

Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1205, and the word “theft” has an accepted common

law definition, id. Therefore, the definition of aggravated felony as including a

“theft offense” is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. See Johnson v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015).

PETITION DENIED.