In the Matter of the Guardianship of Sue Ann Acott, Adult, Bobby Ray Long v. Dan L. Strahl, Steven M. Elsbury, and Gary McDonald (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 15 2016, 9:07 am

court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Bobby Ray Long Dan L. Strahl Indianapolis, Indiana Steven M. Elsbury Greenfield, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA In the Matter of the Guardianship of February 15, 2016 Sue Ann Scott, Adult, Court of Appeals Case No. 30A01-1506-GU-658 Bobby Ray Long, Appeal from the Appellant-Non-Party, Hancock Circuit Court v. The Honorable Richard D. Culver, Judge Dan L. Strahl, Steven M. Trial Court Cause No. Elsbury, and Gary McDonald, 30C01-1403-GU-17

Appellees-Petitioners.

Kirsch, Judge.

^[1] Bobby Ray Long (“Long”) appeals the trial court’s order overruling his

objection to the guardianship of Sue Ann Scott (“Scott”), contending that the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A01-1506-GU-658 | February 15, 2016 Page 1 of 4  trial court abused its discretion when it did so. Finding that Long lacks

standing to bring this appeal, we dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History ^[2] On March 13, 2014, Gary McDonald (“McDonald”) was appointed as

guardian of his mother, Scott. Scott consented to the appointment of

McDonald as her guardian, as did her four children, McDonald, Phillip

McDonald, David McDonald, and Sherrie Sauer (“Sauer”). On June 23, 2014,

Long filed with the trial court a motion to remove guardian. On July 10, 2014,

Sauer, who is Scott’s adult daughter, filed with the trial court a motion to

remove guardian and a request for consolidation of cases to have her motion

consolidated with Long’s motion. The trial court set a hearing on the two

motions, but before the hearing, Long and Sauer moved to withdraw their

motions. On April 10, 2015, the trial court received a letter from Long in which

he requested that McDonald be removed as guardian of Scott. After receiving

the letter, the trial court set a hearing for May 18, 2015 on Long’s objections to

guardianship. After the hearing, the trial court issued an order finding “that . . .

Long is the former boyfriend of . . . Sauer, who apparently is no longer

considered a part of the family.” Appellees’ App. at 9. The trial court ordered

that “the objections to the guardianship filed by . . . Long be, and the same

hereby are, overruled.” Id. Long now appeals.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A01-1506-GU-658 | February 15, 2016 Page 2 of 4  Discussion and Decision ^[3] Initially, we note that our Supreme Court has defined standing as “‘having

sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial

resolution of that controversy.’” Old Nat’l Bancorp v. Hanover Coll., 15 N.E.3d

574, 575-76 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n v. Indianapolis

Newspapers, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 943, 945 (Ind. 1999)). The point of the standing

requirement is to ensure that the party before the court has a substantive right to

enforce the claim that is being made in the litigation. Simon v. Simon, 957

N.E.2d 980, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Standing focuses generally upon the

question of whether the complaining party is the proper person to invoke the

court’s power. Id. “‘However, more fundamentally, standing is a restraint

upon this Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction in that we cannot proceed where there

is no demonstrable injury to the complainant before us.’” Id. (quoting Pence v. State,

652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995)) (emphasis in original).

^[4] Appeals may be taken by either party from all final judgments in circuit courts

and superior courts. Ind. Code § 34-56-1-1. In order to prosecute an appeal,

“the person considering [him]self aggrieved must have first been a party before

the trial court.” Simon, 957 N.E.2d at 988-89. Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A)

provides in pertinent part that a party of record in the trial court shall be a party

on appeal. It has been held by this court that the “converse is also true: a

person who is not a party of record in the trial court cannot become a party for

the first time on appeal.” Simon, 957 N.E.2d at 989 (citing Treacy v. State, 953

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A01-1506-GU-658 | February 15, 2016 Page 3 of 4  N.E.2d 634, 635-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied). Thus, Appellate Rule

17 limits the class of parties on appeal to parties of record in the trial court. Id.

^[5] In the present case, Long was not a party of record in the trial court during the

guardianship proceedings. Long is not related by blood or marriage to Scott,

the protected person who is the subject of the guardianship. The trial court

originally set a hearing in response to Long’s June 23, 2014 motion for removal

of the guardian because a motion had also been filed by Sauer, a child of Scott.

However, no other family member joined Long in his letter sent in April 2015

that again requested the removal of the guardian. At no time did Long ever

petition the trial court to intervene in the guardianship action. Further, Long is

not an aggrieved party in this case. “For a person to be ‘aggrieved’ under the

statute, the probate court’s judgment must be adverse to the person’s legal

interests.” In re Estate of Eguia, 917 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). A

person’s subjective belief that he or she is aggrieved does not control, because

such interpretation would “provide no discernable limit to who could challenge

a probate court’s decision.” Id. Here, while Long may well have a personal

interest, he has no legal interest in Scott, and therefore, the trial court’s order

overruling his objection to the guardianship did not cause any adversity to him.

We, therefore, conclude that Long lacks standing to pursue an appeal of the

trial court’s judgment, and we dismiss his appeal.

^[6] Dismissed.

^[7] Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A01-1506-GU-658 | February 15, 2016 Page 4 of 4