New Show Studios, LLC v. Greg Howe
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 17 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NEW SHOW STUDIOS, LLC, a Nevada No. 16-56906 limited liability company; et al., D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01250-CAS- Plaintiffs-Appellees, MRW
v. MEMORANDUM* GREG HOWE, an individual and DOES, 1 through 20, inclusive,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Greg Howe appeals pro se from the district court’s entry of default judgment
against him in this defamation action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to order
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appellees’ request for oral argument, set forth in the answering brief, is denied. default judgment. Estrada v. Speno & Cohen, 244 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir.
2001). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside
Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment
against Howe because within one week of trial he attempted to terminate his
attorney, failed to retain replacement counsel, and failed to notify in advance the
district court and opposing counsel that he would not attend trial, which resulted in
substantial prejudice to appellees. See Ringgold Corp v. Worrall, 880 F.2d 1138,
1141 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that district court has broad latitude to impose the
sanction of default for non-attendance at trial).
Denial of Howe’s requests to transfer venue was not an abuse of discretion
because Howe unreasonably delayed in seeking transfer until after the date
scheduled for the commencement of trial. See Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 436
(9th Cir. 1987) (setting forth standard of review and upholding district court’s
denial of motion to transfer venue “notwithstanding possible inconvenience to the
witnesses” because “the transfer of this case undoubtedly would have led to
delay”).
AFFIRMED.
2 16-56906