Gosain v. Republic of India

                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


RAJIV SHAH GOSAIN,

               Plaintiff,

       v.                                             Civil Action No. 18-2427 (TJK)

REPUBLIC OF INDIA et al.,

               Defendants.


                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

       This case is the latest installment of a long-running dispute between the American owner

of an Indian company and the Indian government that stems from the company’s bankruptcy pro-

ceedings in India over 20 years ago. The owner, Rajiv Shah Gosain, sued Defendants—the Re-

public of India and several components of the Indian government—for fraud, conspiracy, and

breach of fiduciary duty under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, or FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602

et seq. Defendants move to dismiss. They argue that the Court lacks personal and subject-matter

jurisdiction over them under the FSIA, that the complaint fails to state a claim, and that under the

doctrine of forum non conveniens the litigation should proceed in India. The Court agrees that it

lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Gosain has not properly served them, so it

will allow Gosain limited additional time to perfect service. The Court leaves for another day

Defendants’ other threshold challenges, in the hope that better briefing from the parties will help

the Court resolve them if Defendants are properly served and then renew their motion to dismiss.

I.     Background

       A.      Factual Background

       Gosain alleges in the amended complaint that he was the sole shareholder of TechInvest

India Private, Ltd., an Indian-incorporated company that manufactured insulating materials for
power generation and transmission. ECF No. 26 ¶ 10. In 1999, a creditor of TechInvest brought

a “winding up” petition (akin to an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding) against it. Id. ¶ 11. An

Official Liquidator, appointed by the Indian government, was tasked with overseeing the proceed-

ings. Id. Gosain, a United States citizen, alleges that in 2001 he entered an agreement with the

superintendent of the Official Liquidator to litigate all claims arising from the winding up proceed-

ings in “American Courts only.” ECF No. 26-1 at 3. Gosain and the superintendent entered into

this agreement, he alleges, so that Gosain would not “contest [the Official Liquidator’s] appoint-

ment and activities in Indian Courts.” ECF No. 26 ¶ 11. In exchange for not contesting the Official

Liquidator’s actions in Indian courts, Gosain alleges, the superintendent of the Official Liquidator

agreed to waive its sovereign immunity from suit in the United States. Id. ¶ 13.

       Ultimately, though, it appears that Gosain did not keep up his end of the deal. When the

winding up process concluded, Gosain sued in India to challenge the Official Liquidator’s actions.

ECF No. 26 ¶ 17. He alleges that the Official Liquidator rigged the winding up process in the

favor of another company, which obtained an illegitimate valuation of TechInvest’s assets at far

below their worth, then sold those assets to a rival company “for a fraction of their market value.”

Id. ¶ 15. Gosain further alleges that “[a] portion of the proceeds of the auction has been put to the

use of the Official Liquidator or in the budget of the Republic of India.” Id. ¶ 16. Gosain’s suit

reached the Supreme Court of India, which ruled that the auction of TechInvest’s assets “had been

irretrievably and illegal [sic] tainted by fraud and favoritism.” Id.; see ECF No. 26-2. Thus, the

Supreme Court of India “vitiated” the auction and “ordered the Official Liquidator to immediately

recover TechInvest’s assets.” ECF No. 26 ¶ 17. Still, Gosain alleges that the Official Liquidator

has represented that “it is not able to recover TechInvest’s assets because they have been dissi-

pated, stolen, or embezzled” by the company that bought them at auction. Id. ¶ 18.




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       B.      Procedural History

       In August 2018, Gosain sued the Republic of India, the Indian Ministry of Corporate Af-

fairs, and the Office of the Official Liquidator in the Southern District of New York. ECF No. 1.

The case was then transferred here. ECF No. 18. Following transfer, the Court noted that “the

docket d[id] not reflect that [Gosain] ha[d] made any attempts to serve Defendants.” Minute Order

of December 17, 2018. So it ordered Gosain to file either proof of service or a status report about

service by January 4, 2019. Id. Following various delays, in April 2020, Gosain amended his

complaint and added the Indian Ministry of Law and Justice as a defendant, ECF No. 26, and then

represented that he had served Defendants on January 31, 2020, ECF No. 33 ¶ 10. In his amended

complaint, Gosain alleges that the Official Liquidator committed fraud, made false statements to

him, and breached its fiduciary duties to him. ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 19–28. He also alleges that, in

conspiracy with another company, the Official Liquidator “illegally deprive[d]” him of the fair

market value of TechInvest’s assets. Id. ¶ 30. Gosain alleges that the Court has jurisdiction over

Defendants—all components of the Indian government that could usually claim sovereign immun-

ity—under the FSIA, based on his agreement with the superintendent of the Official Liquidator

(which he construes as a waiver of sovereign immunity) and the Official Liquidator’s alleged ex-

propriation of his property. Id. ¶ 2.

       In August 2020, eight months after he purportedly served Defendants, Gosain filed an Af-

fidavit in Support of Default. ECF No. 34. In September 2020, the Clerk entered default against

Defendants. ECF No. 37. After the entry of default, Gosain moved three times for default judg-

ment, each time unsuccessfully. See ECF Nos. 38, 46, 53, 58; see also Minute Order of July 8,

2021, Minute Order of April 5, 2024.

       In May 2024, Defendants entered an appearance for the first time. ECF Nos. 68–70. De-

fendants then moved to set aside the clerk’s entry of default, which the Court granted. ECF No. 77.


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In its Memorandum Order, the Court noted that default was not warranted because, among several

reasons, “the record [did] not show that Defendants were properly served.” Id. at 3.

       Defendants now move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),

12(b)(2), 12(b)(6), and based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See ECF No. 80. They

argue that Defendants’ sovereign immunity bars suit because Gosain’s agreement with the super-

intendent of the Official Liquidator was not a valid waiver of sovereign immunity and because the

FSIA’s expropriation exception does not apply. They also argue that the Court lacks personal

jurisdiction over Defendants, that the complaint fails to state a claim, and that the Court should

decline jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in favor of litigation in India. See

generally ECF No. 80-1. For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees that it lacks personal

jurisdiction over Defendants because they have not been properly served.

II.    Legal Standard

       Under Rule 12(b)(2), a party may move to dismiss an action when the court lacks personal

jurisdiction. “On such a motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of ‘establishing a factual basis for

the exercise of personal jurisdiction’ over each defendant.” Triple Up Ltd. v. Youku Tudou Inc.,

235 F. Supp. 3d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456

(D.C. Cir. 1990)). “Personal jurisdiction exists under § 1330(b) of the FSIA when an immunity

exception applies and service is proper.” CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S.

223, 237 (2025). Service under the FSIA is laid out in the hierarchical provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1608, and proper service under that statute is the sole way for a court to have personal jurisdiction

over a foreign defendant. See I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Republic of Pakistan, 351 F.3d 1184, 1191

(D.C. Cir. 2003). The FSIA’s service rules “demand[] adherence.” Republic of Sudan v. Harrison,

587 U.S. 1, 19 (2019).




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III.   Analysis

       In support of their contention that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them, Defend-

ants argue both that Gosain failed to properly serve them and that no exception to their sovereign

immunity under the FSIA applies. ECF No. 80-1 at 23–24. The Court need only address the first

to conclude that it lacks personal jurisdiction over them.

       Section 1608(a) governs service on foreign sovereigns under the FSIA. Because India and

the United States have no “special arrangement for service” between them under § 1608(a)(1),

Gosain was next required to try to serve India under § 1608(a)(2). Under that section, service may

be perfected “in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial doc-

uments.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(2). The parties agree that the applicable internation convention is

the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Com-

mercial Matters (“Hague Service Convention”), opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.

361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638.

       Gosain says that he effectuated service under the Hague Service Convention, but he has

failed to show that he did so successfully. He contends that he did so by mailing documents to

“the Ministry of Law and Justice, the Central Authority designated by the Republic of India to

receive service of process.” ECF No. 82 at 3. But “Articles 2 to 6 of the Hague Convention require

that a plaintiff request service from a Central Authority designated by the receiving state and re-

ceive a certificate of service from the Central Authority” stating that service was proper. Saint-

Gobain Performance Plastics Eur. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 23 F.4th 1036, 1038 (D.C.

Cir. 2022) (emphasis added); see also Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U.S. 271, 275 (2017).

Merely requesting service from the foreign country’s Central Authority—without receiving a cer-

tificate of service—is not valid service. Saint-Gobain, 23 F.4th at 1041–42. Gosain concedes that




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he did not receive a certificate of service from India’s Ministry of Law and Justice. ECF No. 82

at 3. That dooms his service argument, full stop.

        Still, Gosain offers two reasons why his attempt at service was valid, but neither can repair

this critical defect.

        First, Gosain points to Article 15(2) of the Hague Service Convention, which allows for a

default judgment to be entered when a plaintiff has (1) “transmitted [the required documents] by

one of the methods provided for in this Convention,” (2) waited at least six months, and (3) failed

to receive a “certificate of any kind . . . even though every reasonable effort has been made to

obtain it.” Gosain asserts that he transmitted service documents to India’s Central Authority, failed

to receive a certificate of service despite his best efforts, and waited over six months. ECF No. 82

at 3–4. So, he argues, he has properly served Defendants according to an alternate method pro-

scribed by the Hague Service Convention. Id. at 4.

        Not so. Articles 15(1) and 15(2) govern the process for obtaining a default judgment, but

as Defendants rightly point out, that standard has nothing to do with resolving a challenge to the

Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction—or more specifically, determining whether service was

valid. That Article 15 is irrelevant here is underscored by its requirement that a defendant “not

[have] appeared” before it kicks in. Hague Service Convention, Art. 15(1); see also e360 Insight

v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 600 n.4 (7th Cir. 2007). In contrast, of course, Defendants

have “entered a limited appearance” in this case. ECF No. 80-1 at 13.

        Second, Gosain argues that actual notice of the suit can satisfy proof of service against a

foreign sovereign under the Hague Service Convention and the FSIA. ECF No. 82 at 5. Because

Defendants have appeared and have actual notice, he argues, the Court may find that they were

properly served. ECF No. 82 at 6–7. He cites out-of-circuit authority for this proposition,




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including Box v. Dallas Mexican Consulate General, 487 F. App’x 880, 886 (5th Cir. 2012) and

Burda Media, Inc. v. Viertel, 417 F.3d 292, 301 (2d Cir. 2005).

       This argument also fails. For one thing, it is flatly contradicted by the D.C. Circuit’s hold-

ing in Saint-Gobain that, based on its “plain text,” the Hague Service Convention requires the

receipt of a certificate from the receiving authority for service to be proper. 23 F.4th at 1042. 1 For

another, as the D.C. Circuit noted in Saint-Gobain, the Fifth Circuit in Box was weighing the issue

of service of process in the context of a motion for default judgment under Article 15, which is

inapplicable here. Id. at 1041–42 (citing Box, 487 F. App’x at 886). The same is true for other

authority Gosain relies on. See Scheck v. Republic of Argentina, No. 10-cv-5167, 2011 WL

2118795, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011). 2 Moreover, all the cases Gosain cites were decided

before the Supreme Court’s admonition in Harrison that the “strict requirements” of the FSIA’s

service provisions “demand[] adherence.” 587 U.S. at 19. Simply put, the Court cannot deviate

from the requirements of the Hague Service Convention and the FSIA in the way Gosain would

like. See Watch Tower Bible & Tract Soc’y of Penn. v. Russian Federation, 804 F. Supp. 3d 153,




       1
          Gosain also argues that Saint-Gobain “simply does not apply here” because the plaintiff
in that case unsuccessfully attempted to rely on Article 15(1)’s default judgment provisions. ECF
No. 82 at 7. Far from it. Saint-Gobain—as opposed to the authority Gosain relies on—is binding
on this Court, and it is directly on point. In that case, the sovereign defendant moved to dismiss
the underlying case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Saint-Gobain, 23 F.4th at 1040. The district
court relied on out-of-circuit authority (including Box) to conclude that service was proper under
the Hague Service Convention even though the plaintiff did not receive a certificate of service. Id.
The Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that receipt of such a certificate is required under the
Hague Service Convention. Id. at 1042.
       2
          The other circuit case Gosain cites addresses service on private individuals or corpora-
tions residing abroad rather than sovereigns, which is irrelevant to whether service was proper
under the FSIA’s framework. Burda, 417 F.3d at 295.



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165 (D.D.C. 2025) (“As a general principle, district courts cannot circumvent the Hague Conven-

tion at whim.” (internal quotations omitted)).

IV.     Conclusion

        For all the above reasons, Gosain has not established that he has properly served Defend-

ants under the Hague Service Convention, and so the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over De-

fendants. That said, for efficiency’s sake, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

without prejudice and allow Gosain a limited time to perfect service, rather than dismiss. 3 See

Barot v. Embassy of the Republic of Zambia, 785 F.3d 26, 29–30 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A separate

order shall issue.

                                                              /s/ Timothy J. Kelly
                                                              TIMOTHY J. KELLY
                                                              United States District Judge

Date: March 19, 2026



        3
          It might also have been more efficient for the Court to have addressed some of Defend-
ants’ other threshold arguments for dismissal now, since they might have fully resolved the case.
See ECF No. 80-1 at 14–23 (arguing this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA),
33–36 (arguing the doctrine of forum non conveniens bars suit). But the Court found the parties’
briefing lacking on them, so it determined that the better course was not to do so at this time. With
respect to whether an exception to Defendants’ sovereign immunity under the FSIA applies, De-
fendants bear the burden to show that Gosain’s identified exception does not apply. Transameri-
can S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Still, the
D.C. Circuit has instructed that in resolving any disputed issues of fact underpinning an immunity
argument, the Court “must give the plaintiff ample opportunity to secure and present evidence
relevant to the existence of jurisdiction.” Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d
36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). And neither party provided much for the Court
to go on to resolve the disputed issue—part of which is factual—of whether under Indian law, the
superintendent of the Official Liquidator had the actual or apparent authority to waive Defendants’
sovereign immunity. Moreover, with respect to Defendants’ invocation of the forum non conven-
iens doctrine, the parties’ factual representations are murky on the threshold question of “whether
there exists an alternative forum” for Gosain’s claims. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
254 n.22 (1981). Defendants do not say whether they are “amenable to process” in their home
jurisdiction, a question the Court must resolve to proceed further in the forum non conveniens
analysis. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And Gosain, for his part, somehow did not ad-
dress the forum non conveniens issue at all.


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