State v. Brand & Nall

BURDICK, Chief Justice. In this consolidated appeal out of Ada County, we address credit for time served under Idaho Code section 18-309. Sterling G. Brand and Joshua M.

Nall each pled guilty to their respective charges while they were already incarcerated due to unrelated charges. Brand and Nall then moved for credit for time served under section 18-309, requesting credit for the time spent incai'cerated after being served with the arrest warrants until judgments of conviction were entered, even though they were already incarcerated due to unrelated charges. The district court denied both motions, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted Brand’s and Nall’s timely petitions for review, and we now reverse the district court. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A.

State v. Brand On November 4, 2014, while jailed in Ada County on a drug possession charge, Brand was served with an arrest warrant for a grand theft charge. On November 7, 2014, Brand was sentenced to seven years with two years fixed for the drug possession charge. On March 24, 2015, Brand pled guilty to the grand theft charge.

On May 12, 2015, the district court entered a judgment of conviction and commitment on the grand theft charge, sentencing Brand to an aggregate term of fourteen years with two years fixed and with the remaining twelve years to run concurrently with the sentence entered on the drug possession conviction. The district court gave Brand four days’ credit for time served. Brand moved for the credit to be increased to 190 days—calculated from when he was served with the grand theft arrest warrant on November 4, 2014, to when judgment for that conviction was entered on May 12, 2015. The district court denied the motion, explaining that “if you ai-e in custody on separate charges and then unrelated charges are filed and you’re in custody, you don’t get credit for that time because you’re not being held on the new charges, you’re being held on the original charges.” Brand timely appeals. B.

State v. Nall On July 23, 2013, while jailed in Ada County on a U.S. Marshals “no bond” hold related to charges in a federal ease, Nall was served with an arrest warrant for several state charges, including conspiracy to commit burglary and providing a firearm to a gang member. On August 22, 2013, Nall began serving a thirty-month sentence for the federal charges.

The U.S. Marshals “no bond” hold was converted to a detainer so that the State could pursue its charges against Nall. On February 26, 2014, Nall pled guilty to conspiracy to commit burglary and providing a firearm to a gang member. On June 3, 2014, the district court entered a judgment of conviction and commitment on the state charges, sentencing Nall to an aggregate term of ten years with two years fixed.

That sentence was set to run concurrently with Nall’s federal sentence. In its judgment of conviction and commitment, the district court noted that “[i]f [Nall] does not receive credit for time served in Federal Custody, then [Nall] shall receive credit for three hundred sixteen (316) days served in prejudgment incarceration as provided by § 18-309, Idaho Code.” On July 22, 2014, the State received confirmation from federal authorities that Nall had received credit for time served in federal custody. On November 3, 2014, the State filed a motion to clarify credit for time served. In that motion, the State pointed out that even though Nall had received credit for time served on his federal sentence, the Idaho Department of Corrections had still awarded credit for time served on his state sentence.

As such, the State requested that Nall be awarded “zero (0) days of credit” on his state sentence. On July 16, 2015, the district court granted the State’s motion, concluding Nall was not entitled to any credit for time served on his state sentence. Nall timely appeals. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When addressing a petition for review, this Court will give “ ‘serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the lower court.’ ” State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 491, 337 P.3d 647, 650 (2014) (quoting State v.

Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007)). III. ANALYSIS Idaho Code section 18-309 governs credit for time served. It provides in relevant part as follows: In computing the tern of imprisonment, the person against whom the judgment was entered shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. I.C. § 18-309(1). This appeal concerns the meaning of the phrase “if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.” Id. (emphasis added). The issue to be decided is whether this statutory language authorizes credit for time served where the relevant period of presentence incarceration is both initiated and maintained due to a prior, unrelated offense.

This Court exercises free review over statutory interpretation because it is a question of law. Pocatello v. State, 145 Idaho 497, 500, 180 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2008). Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language.

State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). That language “is to be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning.” Id. If that language is clear and unambiguous, “the Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory construction.” Id.

We recently construed section 18-309 in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 P.3d 30 (2015). The defendant in Owens pled guilty to eight counts of issuing a check with insufficient funds. Id. at 2, 343 P.3d at 31.

The district court sentenced him to fifteen months with six months fixed on each of the eight counts, which were set to run consecu-lively. Id. The district court granted him credit for time served under section 18-309, but on just one of the eight counts. Id. at 2-3, 343 P.3d at 31-32.

The defendant moved for reconsideration of that calculation, arguing he was entitled to credit for time served on each of the eight counts, but his motion was denied. Id. at 3, 343 P.3d at 32. The defendant timely appealed to this Court, raising the issue whether section 18-309 authorizes credit for prejudgment time served on each sentence for each count. Id. at 3-4, 343 P.3d at 32-33.

We concluded it does and explained as follows: Idaho Code section 18-309’s language plainly gives credit for prejudgment time in custody against each count’s sentence. The statute does not limit that credit in any way. First, Idaho Code section 18-309 mandates that a court gives a defendant credit for his time served because the statute states that a person “shall” receive credit. Second, section 18-309 specifies that a person “shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment....” I.C. § 18-309 (emphasis added).

The statute continues to provide that a defendant gets the credit only on a requirement that incarceration was for “the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.” The statute has a mandatory directive that specifically conditions credit for time served on the fact that the incarceration was for “the offense” for which the judgment was entered. While the word “offense” is singular, the phrase “if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered” simply describes the type of incarceration that a defendant gets credit for. This indicates that as long as the defendant’s prejudgment jail time was for “the offense” the defendant was convicted of and sentenced for, the court gives the defendant that credit. If the legislature had delineated credit for incarceration for “each case” or another description other than “the offense,” the outcome would be different.

Id. at 4, 343 P.3d at 33. In sum, “[w]e h[e]ld Idaho Code section 18-309’s plain language unambiguously states that a defendant receives credit for time served on each of his offenses, whether to be served concurrently or consecutively.” Id. Accordingly, Owens established that credit for time served can accrue on multiple offenses simultaneously. In this case, the district court held that section 18-309 does not authorize credit for time served where the relevant period of presentence incarceration is both initiated and maintained due to a prior, unrelated offense.

In Brand’s case, the district court stated that “if you are in custody on separate charges and then unrelated charges are filed and you’re in custody, you don’t get credit for that time because you’re not being held on the new charges, you’re being held on the original charges.” And in Nall’s case, the district court similarly stated “when [Nall] was served with the Ada County arrest warrant in this case, [Nall] was already being detained as a consequence of charges in the federal case.... [T]he Ada County warrant had no effect upon [Nall’s] liberty when he was already subject to confinement for the federal charges.” Section 18-309’s plain language steers us to a different result. The statute mandates credit for “any period of incarceration” where “such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.” I.C. § 18-309 (emphasis added). Put another way, section 18-309 entitles Brand and Nall to credit for time served “as long as [their] prejudgment jail time was for ‘the offense’ [they were] convicted of and sentenced for[.]” Owens, 158 Idaho at 4, 343 P.3d at 33. Aside from that requirement, the statute “does not limit that credit in any way.” Id.

Section 18-309 does not limit credit for time served only if, for example, the offense for which the defendant is jailed is that which caused the defendant’s initial deprivation of liberty. Rather, section 18-309 applies to all offenses that provide a basis for the defendant’s incarceration. It is irrelevant if the defendant’s incarceration rests on several, unrelated offenses, as the fact remains that each offense provides a basis for the defendant’s incarceration. This principle lends itself to the following two-prong test, which, if satisfied, mandates credit for time served under section 18-309: first, the defendant must have been incarcerated during the intervening period from when the arrest warrant was served and the judgment of conviction was entered; and second, putting aside any alternative reason for the defendant’s incarceration, the relevant offense must be one that provides a basis for the defendant’s incarceration.

Cf. Owens, 158 Idaho at 4, 343 P.3d at 33 (explaining that credit can accrue “towards all ... counts at the same time”). We articulate four scenarios to provide guidance as to how credit is to be determined: Scenario 1: Defendant is already in custody on unrelated charges. He is served with an arrest warrant which requires defendant to post bail.

Defendant does not post bail and remains in custody until sentencing. Defendant is entitled to credit from the date of service of the warrant through the date of sentencing. Scenario 2: Defendant is already in custody on unrelated charges. He is served with an arrest warrant.

At his initial appearance later that day, the State persuades the court to release defendant on his own recognizance. Due to the unrelated charges, defendant remains in custody until sentencing. Defendant is entitled to credit for 1 day served. Scenario 3: Defendant is subject to a war-rantless arrest.

At his initial appearance the next day, bail is set at $600. Defendant posts cash bail the same day, but prior to his release from jail, he is served with a warrant setting bail on an unrelated charge. He remains in custody until sentencing. Defendant is entitled to credit for 2 days served on the warrantless arrest charge.

Scenario 4: Defendant is subject to a war-rantless arrest. At his initial appearance the next day, bond is set at $500. Defendant obtains a surety bond the same day, but prior to his release from jail, he is served with a warrant setting bail on unrelated charges. After the surety’s bail agent leams of the new charge, the bail agent provides the sheriff with a certificate of surrender.

Defendant remains in custody until sentencing. Defendant is entitled to credit for 2 days served prior to the posting of the surety bond as well as credit from the day the certificate of surrender was delivered to the sheriff through the date of sentencing on the warrantless arrest charge. IV. CONCLUSION The district court’s orders denying Brand and Nall credit for time served are reversed. We remand both cases for the district court to enter the correct credit for time served. Justices EISMANN and HORTON concur.